In-Depth Team Analysis: Bayer Leverkusen
Using Data & Footage to Investigate How Xabi Alonso Revamped Bayer Leverkusen into an Unstoppable Force
Intro
One of the most elegant and technically gifted midfielders of the past two decades, Xabier Alonso Olano coached a dominant and invincible league-winning team in the Bundesliga last season — Bayer Leverkusen. Having worked under elite coaches like Carlo Ancelotti, Pep Guardiola, Vicente del Bosque, Luis Aragonés, Rafa Benítez and José Mourinho, Alonso became one of the most decorated players of his generation and now, he’s continuing his legacy as a promising coach.
Xabi previosuly coached Real Soceidad B and led them to a historic promotion to the Segunda División in the 2020–21 season — their first time in Spain’s second tier in 59 years. Xabi’s tenure at Real Sociedad B showcased his preference for dynamic formations and fluid positional play, however carrying his principles of play to the Bundesliga in a club like Bayer Leverkusen would’ve surely been a difficult task.
In this piece, I will try to provide my overview on Alonso’s side both from a tactical point of view and also utilisng data to elaborate on the concepts and principles of play.
Coaching Ideology
Xabi Alonso: “We almost won the league with La Real (Real Soceidad) that sounds quite utopical, but it was because of creating synergies, a big inertia and everything was like that, rather than generated or trained automatisms. It was all… instinctive”.
The fundamentals for the Spaniard certainly seem as ‘synergies’ to create favourable passages of play. In such a game model, the training seems to be done to polish player instincts is what I feel. It allows players to ‘instinctively’ solve problems/scenarios in accordance with their qualities and skillset. Xabi mentions in another interview that the preparation done more game-specific instead of particular formations which certainly hints to the fact that to face such game specific situations, players must have certain responsibilities, which again is in accordance to their skillset. Such player responsibilities along with synergies lay down the foundation for Alonso’s side to build a cohesive and collectively excellent team.
Controlling the game is what the aim is which he himself stresses the importance here. Controlling the game can be done with or without the ball. However, Alonso’s been quite vocal about his love for keeping the ball which can be certainly be seen looking at his team’s plays. His game model seems to bring the best out of top quality players, to name a few–Florian Wirtz, Granit Xhaka, Alejandro Grimaldo, Jeremie Frimpong, Jonas Hofmann, Edmond Tapsoba, Jonathan Tah and Amine Adli. I feel it makes total sense to look at the squad building and recruitment done by the Spaniard before moving into the the analysis part of the piece just to set up a better context.
Building the Squad
Xabi Alonso joined Bayer Leverkusen in 2022, taking charge of a squad struggling in 17th place in the Bundesliga. In just two years, he has built a dominant team, going unbeaten to win the Bundesliga title, lifting the DFB-Pokal, and reaching the Europa League final. This transformation is rooted in more than just assembling top quality players — Alonso’s success lies in applying his game model effectively according to the player profiles available and building a cohesive unit from them.
Recruitment
In his first transfer window, the Spaniard made some interesting signings to strengthen the squad. Alex Grimaldo, a young, smart, technical talent from Benfica as his first-choice Left Wing Back spot caught everyone’s eyes. Viktor Boniface, a quick, intelligent, combinative #9 with a high frame was another massive signing to strengthen the #9 spot alongside the Czech captain — Patrick Schick. But above all, the player which truly elevated the team in almost every department was the Swedish international — Granit Xhaka from Arsenal which didn’t seemed as the wisest of the choice at that time, however Alonso’s top profiling of him into his system, proved everyone wrong. Xhaka played as one of the double pivots in Alonso’s system and truly elevated the team in the ‘orchestrator’ role in build ups whilst also working relentlessly off the ball. Both Xhaka and Grimaldo played the most minutes for the invincible team, indicating the two major recruitments by Alonso worked off well while Boniface sadly missed plenty of the games due to injuries.
Mid-season, players like Edmond Tapsoba, O. Kossounou and Amine Adli unfortunately had to leave due to AFCON and Xabi had to make adjustments especially in the backline with Tapsoba and Kossounou being exceptionally well in ball progression. However, Josip Stanišić & Piero Hincapié came and played their part well for the RCB and LCB spot respectively. Robert Andrich (# 6) on the other hand, also came in handy who could play in the backline with his great ball-winning and aerial qualities.
Certainly, the system has players who could offer multiple roles especially, higher up making rotations and overloads adding to the fluidity in plays. Here’s how the squad looked in the Xabi’s preferred back 3 setup. Obviously, this shape was quite fluid in different attacks against different teams which well discuss very soon in detail but this below, hopefully gives a rough idea of the setup.
Below is a rough sketch of the contents and priciples of play, I will touch upon which I feel are fundamental for Xabi’s side. ↓
Base 3 + 2 buildup
The three first-choice players in the back 3 — Tapsoba, Tah and Kossounou possess similar qualities — great on the ball, dominant aerially but most importantly — quick in recovering balls the opposition launches thanks to Leverkusen’s high line in possession. With Xhaka and Palacios/Andrich in the double pivot, Alonso’s side very much depicts a possession heavy side prioritising building from the back. The backline is frequently positioned at a great height and builds play in a brave manner. This high positioning of the backline (especially outside CBs) greatly benefit the setup in both circulation as well as in the outer-pressing phase.
Invite pressure → handle pressure
Alonso’s side are certainly great at breaking down settled opposition shapes. Against settled opposition shapes, it’s greatly beneficial to invite pressure and consequently handle/sustain the said pressure which intends to create misbalances (creating gaps) in the opponents shape and exploit such gaps. The 5 player base (3 + 2) aids in quick circulation which often invites pressure depending on the opposition pressing triggers (mostly on the #6 and outside CBs). Interestingly, Kossounou/RCB would often maintain a slightly higher position from the backline hinting a diagonal ball into himself which deliberately provokes a jump from the oppositional second line and Leverkusen surely seems quite drilled in such plays.[watch video after this part to understand it better!]
Close proximity
Structurally, Leverkusen players are set up very close to each other especially the first two lines which obviously helps in optimising their quick circulation to invite and handle the pressure.
The intention behind having to circulate is simply to exploit the shifting of the opposition’s front line and seek to connect with players higher — #10s & Wing-Backs. Depending on the pressure on the ball — the receiver can look to progress play by carrying the ball higher — in such a case, Leverkusen players on the near-side would stay ball-facing and motion/move away from the ball seeking to receive back-to goal → baiting pressure from behind → using quick combos to exploit space behind.
Line breaking passes
These smaller distances benefit Leverkusen in controlling the tempo of the attack, like in the cases afforementioned. After successfully manipulating the opposition’s structure, line-breaking passes from the base takes full advantage of the disorganised shape in order to progress the ball. These passes mostly received by the interiors — Florian Wirtz & Jonas Hofmann who are great in operating in tight spaces and also comfortable in linking play with different body orientations.
These line breaking passes certainly accelerate the attack (due to the vertical angle + the passer releasing the ball in high velocity to break opposition line) which often catches the opposition players off guard. Xhaka, Tapsoba, Tah & Palacios in particular are drilled perfectly in this regard.
Xhaka → Wirtz line breaking passes are a common pattern for Leverkusen’s attacks. Both players perfectly complement each others’ profiles. With Xhaka, being the one who plays the threatening line breaking pass, Wirtz is the one who can operate against great degree of pressure and small space.
Xhaka → Wirtz line breaking passes are a common pattern for Leverkusen’s attacks. Both players perfectly complement each others’ profiles. With Xhaka, being the one who plays the threatening line breaking pass, Wirtz is the one who can operate against great degree of pressure and small space.
Using tracking data, I calculated space creation metrics for Leverkusen here. According to that, Xhaka creates aprox. 2.57 yards of radius space per pass which is highest in Leverkusen, while Wirtz receives in approx. 0.22 yards of space per pass which is second lowest just below Boniface (CF). To simplify this, Xhaka ‘creates’ the most space through passes while Wirtz, thanks to his role receives threatening passes in tight spaces and use his quality to find solutions.
(if you’re interested in reading more on the methodologies behind the creation of the space creation metrics you may read it here!)
Here’s some complied clips of the principles mentioned above ↓
Constructing attacks & Handling Pressure
Third man combinations
A circulation heavy side will inherently have to be well drilled in comfortably handling pressure using the third man principle. In my opinion, to effectively perfect the combinative play of the team, players must be trained this principle both from a physical level (drills) but as well as on a psychological level too which can be very well be seen for Leverkusen. The constant urge from the players to always look/scan for available options and
The larger objective is to access critical spaces which depend on the opposition’s setup. Third man combinations when executed well, would allow just that by ‘moving the opposition by moving the ball’.
“Each pass has a message” — Xabi Alonso ↑
I feel this perspective seems like a perfect way to sum up Leverkusen’s sheer quality in breaking down defences with great speed in attack. The real intention — the message — is for intended player to exploit that space as the third man. It’s like setting up a chain reaction, where each pass nudges the game towards a specific outcome. Props have to made for Leverkusen’s coaching staff for integrating such principles in such a short amount of time mostly because these passes/sequences look simple but are hard to execute because they require great coordination and cognitive understanding between players themselves whilst also maintaining the correct positional balances.
Playing ‘through’ the press
Stretching forward lines
One way of accessing players between the lines is by stretching opposition lines which creates horizontal spacing for the pass. A common pattern is using the wide CB (sometimes WB) to provoke a jump in such a manner that the opponent moves in a horizontal angle towards the receiver → opens diagonal option in between the lines — a third man principle yet again.
The primary aim is to create the said separation to access between the lines team-mates and start the chain reaction of passes to penetrate in an accelerated speed. The video compilation below should demonstrate that in a better manner.
Dropping player from the forward line
Dropping movements from an interior helps in creating these scenarios. These are the zig zag resembling sequences which involve using a player from a height to move/drop between the lines and who would get pressured upon reception to backpass acting as a link. This movements from the interior intends drag an opposition pressing player → create vertical spacing.
The deep positioning of the pivots to attract opposition 2nd line is also important since it removes the danger of directly negating the access to the interior (opposite player marking the interior by staying in front of him) and instead has only the marker applying pressure from the back which is in fact preferred and is enough to combine play.
Hence, Wirtz & Hofmann greatly benefits in such sequences as they can play such quick combinative passes in tight spaces and access the intended player in space (free man) who could initiate the chain reaction of passes and accelerate the attack.
Playing ‘over’ the press
Due to almost having the second line of the double 6s very close to the backline, often a situation could arise when the opposition could very easily cut off immediate access to both 6s. Third man combos via backpasses is predominantly the best way how Leverkusen combat with this, however, if the opposition players (especially from the second line) jumps on the 6s in a manner in which there is a massive vertical gap left making the midfield line and the second line disjointed, playing over the block/press is a great tool in progressing play.
High Pressure Zone → Low pressure Zone
Such chipped balls played over the press mostly occur on the flanks when all immediate options are cut off and access to the far-side is not optimal since play gets isolated on one side of the pitch. This manifests a high pressure zone for the player with the ball on the flanks while simultaneously low pressure zone higher up is created which is accessible thanks to said chipped balls. The primary reason why these chipped balls are lethal is down to the fact that the midfield line which creates the high pressure zone becomes too distant to the backline (low pressure zone) where the ball arrives — adds to the dynamism of these attacks since these chipped/long balls are mostly followed by receiving player trying to hit the space in behind the defensive line and the large distance between the defensive line and midfield line means more time for the midfield line to track back to help against the attack.
Exploit FB-CB Channel
Most commonly, such chipped balls are targeted towards the opposition’s FB-CB interval exploited by runs from the WB or the #10. The #9 could pin the opposition CB while WB would be in a 1v1 dynamic superiority (WB runs in behind and has the momentum advantage since FB reacts to his actions) to effectively optimise such sequences.
Below is video compilation of some relevant sequences ↓
Substructures & Connections — Triangles
What is a substructure?
Under my perception, a ‘substructure’ is when a team with the ball would position themselves in a manner which aims to utilise the positional advantages which come by multiple passing angles — connections, whilst having spatial understanding for subsequent movements. [This is my definition/understanding with some broken grammar but I hope this paints a good idea before we dive deep into this principle.]
Alonso’s side always look to overload the ball-side along with players positioning themselves in close proximity. This principle certainly seems like what Xabi himself played for Spain in the 2010s (especially the 2012 Euro winning side) and is replicating now for Leverkusen.
What does a substructure within the team’s organised structure helps in?
Multiple players arrive closer to the ball but also looking for spaces to position themselves in a manner which ‘connects’ them to their counterparts. These connections create routes and passing lanes which in turn pave way for circulation to move the ball into the free/indefensible space to progress play. In the below example, the space of mutual help (hypothetical term used in the image below) gives immediate options for the ball carrier and connections help in the ball to arrive into the free space.
If the ball moves into the free space, it simply becomes difficult for the defenders to the defend the space. The aim for Leverkusen here, would always be to support the ball carrier providing themselves as an option. These multiple ‘options’ in the space of mutual help hypothetically ‘connect’ one player to another and since the distance are so close, accessing these connections is also much easier.
The cohesive nature of these substructures allows Leverkusen, more control on the play. A simple pass to one player opens more options for the receiver who according to their stregths and possible scenario at play decides the next move — backpass, receive & turn into space, receive and stall the ball to bait pressure like in the below example ↓ and so much more possibilities.
Such a system heavily depends on the interiors (Florian Wirtz, Jonas Hofmann) on how Leverkusen construct their attacks. The said system is reliant on having different substructures/connections to progress play in which the interior occupying the half space channel almost always plays an integral role in such a phase.
For example, vs a more settled block ↓
Here, Hofmann placed in the half space channel experiences tight pressure. Still, by utilising wall passes, body orientations and supporting movements from the ‘substructure’ Leverkusen are able to set up their attack. These slightest of adjustments which players positioning or arriving in the critical spaces mostly in the half-space channel make
These connections/substructures also, help in creating space for third man runs: the close connections allow quick exchange of passes which along with simultaneous movements from the neighbouring players serve as decoy movements opening up critical space for the third man run. ↓
During a more ‘transitional phase’ or when the state of game is more in ‘motion’, its more common the the # 6 being responsible to advance the ball higher up (in to out carries), which mostly creates a diamond in the wider lanes like in the below examples.
Here, ive complied some of the said examples ↓
Importance of Florian Wirtz
I’ve alredy mentioned importance of interiors in Alonso’s system where supporting the ball carrier and having substructures is of great importance. So, someone like Wirtz who is capable operating in the tightest of spaces thanks to his excellent ball reception technique (half-turns and far foot receptions) fits this idea perfectly.
Its incredible to see how Wirtz links play for Leverkusen. His far foot receptions on vertical line breaking passes and receiving high-velocity passes even in tight spaces is really wonderful. We can see his affinity to target the box when receiving such passes. he often receives line breaking passes which are often launched with high-velocity and hence require great technique to control (and often utilise) the momentum in progressing and accelerating attacks. Utilisations of half-turn body orientation and far foot receptions are often vital. Obviously, someone like Xhaka whose capable of such pinpoint line breaking passes really helps.
Importance of Granit Xhaka
Major part of the reason why Leverkusen are so good in such combinations is that they are capable of ‘moving the opponent’ by movingt he ball and dictate the play for which their #6s — Xhaka & Palacios/Andrich should be credited for. Here’s Xhaka’s progressive carries. Notice the large spaces (right graph) which show the se movements where he’s responsible in carrying the ball in the final third to create the substructures which Leverkusen utilise for progression.
Even though, he primarily picks the ball from the CBs and advances play, a lot of times he is also useful in circulating the ball. The viz on the left really just demonstrates that role and how he sets up attacks targeting half space channels.
Wide Play Dynamics
Combinative Play & Usage of Back Passes
Structurally, with the wide CBs are always eager to push high, they’re always available as an option to circulate. Hence, while constructing attacks the ball carrier could look to backpass depending on the scenario. Commonly, the midfield line (both #6s) would be very near to the backline which would have 2 CBs while ball-sided CB would push high working like a FB & the ball-sided WB would hold the width high and wide. Such a structure, intends to find players between the lines and back passes would allow to enlarge the space between the lines.
Overload → Switch
Since, such a structure itself creates overloads in the wide channel, oppositions often shuttles across to defend the space which means that when the Leverkusen player receives in enough space, the subsequent action is often driving the ball centrally. This is what Jeremie Frimpong is exceptionally great at.
Another approach to exploit the shuttling across of the opposition block is to switch play to the weak-side. This approach is mostly undertaker if the player on the ball’s options are not optimally positioned and especially if the the vertical distance from the ball carrier to the option is very long.
Pass & Move
This is probably one of the passage of play which seems to be well conditioned in accordance with the qualities of the players and got well drilled over time in the training — the pass and move. Though there’s been a discourse around the execution of it, Alonso’s side seems to have inculcated it to break down defensive setups in their wide play dynamics.
Adding dynamism to attacks is a great way of catching the defenders out of focus to progress play. The pass and move from certain leverkusen players when especially when the ball is wide allows this dynamism in attack.
Such movements tend to create space, player A who passes the ball to the wide player runs into space which hypothetically drags his marker to open space for player B who receives wide to attack the left space in a much better space (optimising the 1v1). It could also add the moving player Aan option in the wide substructure.
For Leverkusen, such (↑) passes by RCB Kossounou to Frimpong are a great way to attack down the flanks. It certainly bring the best out of both players — Kossounou’s eye for the wide diagonal pass and moving ahead + Frimpong’s top notch 1v1 ball carrying ability to attack the space created via Kossounou’s movements + better counterpress thanks to Kossounou’s new positioning if Frimpong fails the 1v1.
Kossounou who behaves like a Right Back during such attacks loves to pass it to his conuterpart and moves inside rhe right half space while Grimaldo on the other hand passes more laterally rather than vertically and runs in behind the defensive line
As important the pass and move is to add dynamism, equally important is to ‘pass and support’ is. This helps to mantaining support to the receiving player since the player is receiving in the wider channel → opposing defender would try to compress the space by quickly jumping towards the ball and using the byline as an extra → the receiving player would have very less time and space to attack → would eventually lose the ball with poor counterpress for Leverkusen to regain the ball.
Kossounou here pass and supports Frimpong instead of moving into the free space. This slows down attack (which is not a bad thing, if intentional), Leverkusen players move towards the ball to circulate and Frimpong then passes and moves when the opportunity is better and the attack gets accelerated catching defenders off guard.
Kossounou mantaining the position also helps in the counterpress to regain the ball. ↓
The pass and move along with pass and support adds unpredictability to the wide attacks and allows Leverkusen to control tempo of attacks, below are some relevant clips ↓
Better Counterpress
The above quote by Xabi himself tells the fact how such wide overloads and the priciples aforementioned allow for a better position for a counterpress.
The idea of giving more passes — stresses the importance of circulation and combinative in the system is and how it is linked/intertwined with the counterpressing dynamics. When playing down the flanks, a small portion of such circulation/combinative play passes are bound to fail for the opposition to lose the ball → the overall structure, distances, players from beneath (above image) all play an important role to regain the ball back.
Final Third Dynamics
#6s around the edge of the box — when attacking in the final third, the 6s tend to roam around the edge of the box — receiving possible lay-offs and central positioning also tends to allow better switching off play if necessary. Also, allows for better counterpressing as well.
Such positioning gives better connectivity. A prime example could be certin player taking on a defender in closed space around the ‘assist zone’ of the box, the presence of someone like Xhaka or Palacios allows a quick and safe option to pass into — the critical space
Late runs happen into the box which are more sudden which are also aided by the #6s positioning acting as the link.
Ball Carrying Threat of Frimpong who is a deadly ball carrier is also what makes such dynamics even more lethal. His passes around the edge of the box in the below graph perfectly highlight such dynamics. You’d see him carrying the ball penetrating deep into the block and when he attracts opposition players (see the small spaces on the left graph) you’d see him passing into nearside player (#6) around the critical space.
Such dynamics alongside the #9/Schick/Boniface pinning the backline, Grimaldo drifting inside + his ability to run deep giving the attacking players a plethora of options to chose from, just like Xabi says: “We try to get benefit from the quality of the players to get the advantage”.
Below are some great clips to further illustrate the examples, I would definitely recommend looking at ↓
Counterpressing Dynamics & Rest-Defence
Counterpressing definitely one of the strongest areas of play for Leverkusen just perfectly shown by the above graph. Since, Leverkusen keep their defensive line very high in the opposition half — they leave spaces in behind and will always run the risk of facing counter attacks. So how do they cope up with it?
When the ball is lost higher up the pitch, players in accordance with their distance to the ball have certain tasks.
Players closer to the ball are responsible to commmit immediate pressure and close down the space for the ball carrier. Such players are very ball-oriented in how they defend the space as quickly as possible to regain the ball. This is another reason, why the in-possession substructures (talked about above) play a vital role in this phase as well illustrating how well the in-possession structure benefits out of possession structure.
For players slightly distant and not around immediate proximity, its important to cut off passing lanes and look to defend in-behind runs according to the situation.
Area of Cooperation & Area of mutual help as discussed earlier can also by used as hypotheticals to highlight Leverkusen’s Counterpress-Rest defence organization. ↓
Leverkusen’s rest defence is rock solid against opposition counter attacks. The 3 CBs — Tapsoba, Tah & Kossounou are well drilled to recover against counter attacks + lethal in duels. Such good player quality when put under a structure which makes full use of it in Alonso’s system brings the best out of the players. Below are some great clips ↓
“Passing Lane Oriented” Press to Guide Wide
While pressing from the front, the fundamental mechanism utilised to pressure is to cut off direct options and the nature of the press is very “Passing Lane Oriented” (has its resemblance to what is widely termed as “man orientation”, I just prefer the former more descriptive in the case for Leverkusen). By anticipating where the ball is most likely to go, the press is designed to funnel play away from dangerous central channels and instead push the opposition into the wide areas — where the attacking threat is often less potent. The players seem to not simply chase the ball but instead read its potential passing options, positioning themselves to intercept or block forward progress.
Role of Frontline — Make Play Predictable
When pressing from the front, Leverkusen would mostly have their front 3 against the opposition backline looking to guide the press out-wide to their respective Full-backs. The #10s — Wirtz, Hofmann & Adli, hence, play an important role in timing their jumps on their marker — the receiving CB. The below viz demonstrates how the these #10s are important in applying pressure closer to the box cutting central access and guiding play wider.
Such passes to the FB intend to make play predictable for Leverkusen’s players who are trained well to then regain the ball received by the wider player which is another sign of great trained synergies. Such sequences would begin with the #10 being tasked to curve his press (in to out or out to in depending on the position and orientation of the ball carrier) while having the near-side DM on their cover-shadow. Sometimes this DM/CM would also be pressed from behind by the Leverkusen #6 from behind who also play a decisive role in such sequences to be fully effective (we’ll discuss that in the following portion↓).
Role of the #6s
Like mentioned above, this relationship — the kind of partially screening the opp. CM along with the #6 pressing the opposing CM from behind is what makes direct passes centrally always unfavourable and hence forcing play out-wide. Such a 5 man shape (2+3 below) also helps in the shifting dynamics of the block which makes horizontal circulation from the backline locked to one side and difficult to access the opp. DM through third man combinations (for example CCB → RCB → DM in the below graphic is difficult thanks to the shifting dynamics by which Adli LW would press the RCB making the angle to the near0-side DM difficult with less time. Even if the DM is accessed, he would then be pressed by Andrich/DM from behind)
Another important task for the #6s is to support the backline by running back and helping defensively if the opposition somehow manages to bypass the press from deep build ups. This helps in suffocating space for the opposition which will inherently look to attack quickly given the nature of such attacks. Player oriented designations (CB following his marker) help in slowing down attacks along with the help of the #6s dropping back. This role of the #6s also comes in handy if the opposition looks to play long giving support on second balls which Leverkusen are nearly perfect are thanks to the aerially dominant backline players.
A good solution against this Leverkusen’s press is to try to create overload against the backline in deep build ups and exploit the shifting of the frontline by dropping a forwards from the overloaded zone. Borussia Mönchengladbach did this by dropping Dack from the frontline which created problems for Leverkusen if Kossounou (his marker) was even slightly late to jump. So, a great alternative used when facing such dynamics is to have both #6s moderately deeper but just enough to cover the gaps left by shifting of the frontline and block those diagonals when ball plays out-wide.
Some relevant clips ↓
“Inside diagonal” trap & Mid-Block Dynamics
Another very interesting pressing trap which Leverkusen utilise is when they deliberately provoke ‘inside diagonals’ (diagonal passes from the wide player to a central player, mostly in the middle third). Structurally, Leverkusen deploy a 5–2–3 in the mid block where both #6s have large gaps to cover on their sides and teams would look to exploit those gaps. Leverkusen, look to bait passes to these gaps which get covered by their pressing mechanisms — shifting of 2nd line, small distance to between last 2 lines, jump from WB at the right moment/time.
Depending on the opposition’s structure would either keep a player free (Roma game example below) or a passing lane free for a player to move into which is termed as ‘deliberately left space’ in the subsequent examples. The 2 setups mentioned below differ mostly on positioning and coverage which is because of the opposition’s shapes, however, the principles of making play predictable when the ball goes wide → players being alert to close down space remain similar.
The data, very well supports the claim and highlights how important this pressing trap is in Leverkusen’s settled mid block dynamics ↓
The most difficult aspect in the execution of such sequences is to control the play which leads to the ‘trigger pass’ to wide player (Full-Back/Wide Centre Back). This trigger pass is when the off ball mechanisms from the structure takes place — shifting of the lines, curving the press by Winger to cut off central pass (since the near-side #6 would be 1v1 with the opposing player having the momentum and passing options advantage — hence, the 2v1 by Adli and Andrich — #6 + Winger relationship) and guide play to the desired player moving into the half space.
After baiting play to the ‘deliberately left space’ its important to clode down said space. The overall shifting of the block along with smaller distance allows the closing down of such space efficient. The player(s) whove decided to close down the space always have the advantage over the receiving player since they are able to read such passes much earlier as sson as the ball shifts wide + by mostly pressing from behind, they would have the momentum advantage against a more ‘stationary’ player. Below are some interesting examples. ↓
Conclusion & Personal Thoughts
Xabi’s work for the Werkself has been tremendously mind blowing without a doubt. The achievements in the 2023–24 season speak for it. But more than the achievements, the type of footballing ideas he has integrated in the team in such a short amount of time is even more fascinating. At the time of writing, Leverkusen sit 2nd in the Bundesliga table with a 6 point gap from the table leaders — Bayern Munich and qualified for the UCL playoffs. Although, Xabi joining Real Madrid in the future is quite imminent (😰) it would be exciting to see where he leads this team to in the near future.
If you made it this far, I really hope you enjoyed the read and I would appreciate any feedbacks on my socials (Twitter, BlueSky, LinkedIn, Mail or here itself). I dont really mention this but I’ll be actually looking for work this summer and if you could help me in that in any manner, I’d really appreciate it a lot!
